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Abstract
We study the optimal mechanism in a dynamic sales relationship where the buyers arrival
date is uncertain, and where his value changes stochastically over time. The buyers arrival
date is the rst date at which contracting is feasible and is his private information. To induce
immediate participation, the buyer is granted positive expected rents even if his value at arrival
is the lowest possible. The buyer is punished for arriving late; i.e., he expects to earn less of the
surplus. Optimal allocations for a late arriver are also further distorted below rst-best levels.
Conditions are provided under which allocations converge to the e¢ cient ones long enough after
contracting, and this convergence occurs irrespective of the time the contract is initially agreed
(put di¤erently, the so-called "principle of vanishing distortions" introduced by Battaglini (2005)
continues to apply irrespective of the buyers arrival date).
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1 Introduction
Markets for most goods are highly dynamic. Buyers may become interested in acquiring goods at
di¤erent times, such as when they rst encounter advertisements for the product. Once in the
market, their preferences can be expected to change. Buyerseagerness to consume often hinges on
their own circumstances. Purchasers of cellular telephone plans or wireless internet packages, for
instance, have preferences that uctuate with their available leisure time and contact with friends.
Commercial buyersneeds may change in long-term supply relationships. For instance, a restaurants
preferences for acquiring high-quality ingredients from a supplier may vary with changes in its menu,
which may come at the whim of the chef.
This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a buyer who has vertical preferences over the
quality levels that the seller can supply. The buyers arrival date to the market (which is the
rst date he can contract with the seller) is uncertain and, having arrived, his preferences evolve
stochastically with time. The key di¢ culty for designing the prot-maximizing mechanism in such
a setting is that the buyer is strategic, and can hidehis (privately known) arrival to the market.
That is, he may participate in the mechanism only at the moment of his choice. In particular, the
buyer may prefer to wait to learn if his preferences will change before participating.
That the revelation principle applies in our set-up means that there is never any loss in inducing
the buyer to participate in the mechanism immediately upon arrival; in fact, such a policy is typically
strictly the most protable. Because a buyer who has not yet participated in the mechanism retains
the ability to wait and participate at a later date, he enjoys a positive outside option. This outside
option is endogenous, since it depends on the sellers choice of mechanism for later participation dates.
An optimal mechanism therefore punishes late participation: If the buyer participates later, then he
faces worse terms of trade, purchases quality levels which are distorted further below their e¢ cient
levels, and expects to earn less rent. By lowering the option value of waiting, the seller extracts
more of the surplus for herself. Our nding thus contrasts with the much simpler case of constant
values, where the optimal mechanism involves a repetition of the static optimum, and where the
buyer therefore receives the same treatment irrespective of the participation date. Because values
are persistent in our setting, how the buyer fares if delaying participation depends on his current
value for quality, and this means the value of his outside option is type dependent.1
The quality levels supplied under a contract signed at a given date  depend critically on the
ratio between the probability of arrival at date  and the probability of arrival at any earlier date.
A smaller ratio implies that the seller cares relatively less about e¢ ciency at date  and more about
limiting the rents available in case of arrival before  . When the ratio decreases with time, the
optimal quality allocations thus become increasingly (downward) distorted at later contracting dates.
When the horizon is innite, and when the buyer arrives at each date with positive probability, the
1See Jullien (2000) for a study of (static) mechanism design with type-dependent outside options.
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ratio necessarily converges to zero with time. The rents the buyer expects for an optimal mechanism
then converge to zero as the participation date goes to innity.
Although the buyer receives lower qualities if he arrives late, it is often still the case that quality
prescriptions converge to their rst-best levels after a su¢ ciently long relationship. Put di¤erently,
the principle of vanishing distortionsrst described by Battaglini (2005) and adapted to richer
settings by Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014) continues to hold. The reason is that quality choices at
dates long after the relationship has commenced have little e¤ect on the information rents that the
buyer expects, as perceived at the time of contracting. This is familiar from the existing literature:
loosely, the result is driven by an assumption that a buyers initial value for quality is a poor predictor
of his value far in the future. Of course, many stochastic processes fail such a restriction; existing
work (see, e.g., Boleslavsky and Said, 2013, Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2014, Skrzypacz and Toikka,
2015, and Bergemann and Strack, 2015) shows how distortions can fail to vanish if the type process
is su¢ ciently persistent.
Outline. The rest of the paper is as follows. The remainder of this section provides a review
of related literature. Section 2 then introduces a model in which the buyer can have at most two
values for quality (building on work by Battaglini, 2005, as explained below). Section 3 provides a
detailed analysis of the two-value model and Section 4 concludes. Appendix A provides proofs of all
results relating to the two-value model, while Appendix B provides additional results (with proofs)
for the model with a continuum of values (which builds, especially, on work by Pavan, Segal and
Toikka, 2014).
1.1 Related literature
This paper connects two distinct lines of research in dynamic mechanism design. One strand
considers prot-maximizing mechanisms for agents whose preferences evolve stochastically with time
and who are available to participate at the date the principal xes the mechanism (see, e.g., Baron
and Besanko (1984), Besanko (1985), Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eso and Szentes
(2007), and Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014)). The other considers dynamic mechanisms when
agents arrive over time but preferences do not change (see, e.g., Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984),
Board (2008), Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009), Said (2012), Pai and Vohra (2013) and Board and
Skrzypacz (2016)).2 While these strands have mainly developed independently (see Bergemann and
Said (2011) for a summary), combining features from both is an important step towards realism and
allows us to uncover new tradeo¤s.
The analysis in the main text focuses on a highly tractable framework that builds on Battaglini
(2005). Battaglini studies a dynamic contracting setting with a xed and commonly known partic-
2There is also a literature with dynamic arrivals but without commitment; examples include Conlisk, Gerstner and
Sobel (1984) and Dilme and Li (2016).
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ipation date, and where the buyer can have only two values for quality. The buyers value evolves
according to a rst-order Markov process. The key novelty in our set-up is that the buyers arrival
date to the market which is the rst date at which a contract can be agreed is instead uncertain
and the buyers private information. The optimal mechanism must therefore permit participation
at each possible arrival date (unlike in Battaglinis model, where the buyer is simply excluded for-
ever if he does not participate at the rst opportunity). An important di¢ culty, new relative to
Battaglinis paper, is that design of the mechanism is non-separable across di¤erent participation
dates. For example, adjustments to how the buyer is treated when participating at any given date
typically necessitate adjustments also to the treatment for earlier dates, in order to preserve the
buyers incentive constraints (in particular, to guarantee timely participation in the mechanism).
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the present paper builds on an earlier working paper,
Garrett (2011), which was the rst to address dynamic mechanism design with both dynamic arrivals
and stochastic evolution of preferences. A key aim of the present paper is to summarize insights
from the earlier work, but in a simplied setting.3
Deb and Said (2015) have since provided an analysis of a two-period model, where a unit is
allocated in the second period and there is no competition among buyers. Deb and Said solve
the case where the seller fully commits (as in the present work), but then focus on relaxing this
commitment ability. That the seller allocates a single homogeneous unit to a single buyer simplies
the analysis, facilitating a characterization of the optimal mechanism under quite weak restrictions
on the distribution of buyer information and values (in particular, see the full-commitment case).
The present paper instead considers variable quality in a repeated Mussa-Rosen framework. The
approach in this paper necessarily di¤ers from Deb and Said and appears more readily applicable to
a broad class of contracting problems (including multi-agent settings).
Ely, Garrett and Hinnosaar (forthcoming) also provide an analysis of a two-period problem, with
allocation of the good in the second period. The focus there, however, is on a restricted "simple"
mechanism (where early ticket sales are made at a single price, but auctions are permitted to reallo-
cate capacity). Unlike the two-period settings of Deb and Said and Ely, Garrett and Hinnosaar, the
present paper analyzes an arbitrary horizon length. It therefore elucidates how optimal mechanisms
evolve when agent participation can take place over longer horizons, and shows how the distortions
in optimal mechanisms tend to accumulate over time, so that agents who arrive later receive more
distorted allocations. For instance, studying longer horizons allows us to examine issues such as
the limiting behavior of mechanisms as the arrival time becomes arbitrarily late, as well as the ap-
plicability of the so-called "principle of vanishing distortions" for relationships that have lasted a
su¢ ciently long time.
3The earlier (unpublished) paper considers a durable goods setting. The dynamic optimization problem there is
more complex, motivating the simpler environment of the present paper.
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Perhaps the most important antecedents to Garrett (2011), and hence the present paper, are
Deb (2011, 2014) and Nocke, Peitz and Rosar (2011).4 Deb studies a sellers optimal price path in
an innite-horizon setting where a buyer arrives at a xed date (date zero), and his value changes at
a single random time. Deb nds that the optimal price path often features low introductory pricing.
Given the restriction to a price path, a buyer often chooses not to participate in the mechanism at
rst instance; that is, he chooses to delay his purchase decision. The seller may choose a higher
price at later dates (after date zero) precisely to deter delay in purchasing. Nocke, Peitz and
Rosar study a two-period model where the buyer learns his value only at the second date. They
also nd that introductory pricing can be optimal (again, this can reect the sellers aim to punish
delayed purchase). The optimal price path in their paper turns out to implement also the optimal
mechanism (as chosen without any restrictions). Notably, this means that the seller sometimes
nds it optimal to induce participation at a date after the buyer is initially available, although by
the revelation principle she could achieve the same outcome by always inducing participation at
the initial date. In our setting (as noted above), the seller instead typically nds it strictly more
protable to induce buyer participation in the mechanism at the rst possible instant. Participation
then occurs at di¤erent dates in our optimal mechanism only because the buyers arrival date is
random/heterogeneous.
There are still further papers highlighting the value to a seller of deterring delayed purchase.
Garrett (2016) studies the optimal price path in an innite-horizon setting where buyers arrive over
time, and where values then change randomly over time. Armstrong and Zhou (2015) study com-
mitments a seller may make to deter buyers from searching for a better product and then returning
to purchase. While these papers focus on particular applications and selling formats, the present
paper focuses on developing a mechanism design approach that can be applied quite generally in
settings where agents arrive over time and have preferences that change randomly.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Basics. We consider a repeated buyer-seller relationship in discrete time, which starts at date t = 1
and lasts until the end of period T 2 f2; : : : ;1g . The buyer values consumption of a non-durable
good, which can be provided by the seller in each period. Both buyer and seller have a common
discount factor   1 ( < 1 in case T =1).
4Other antecedents include Mierendor¤ (2016) and Deb and Pai (2013). These papers consider buyers who are
heterogeneous not only in their value for the good (which is constant across time), but also in the deadline they face
for purchasing it. The optimal mechanism can be implemented as a "biased" auction on a nal date, with what
Mierendor¤ terms an (endogenous) "outside option" to purchase the good at a posted price before the auction. Under
this implementation, buyers may again face a choice between participating in the mechanism (by purchasing the good
at the posted price) or delaying participation until a later date (say participating in the biased auction).
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The buyer arrives at some date  2 f1; : : : ; Tg. This is the rst date at which the buyer is
available to communicate with the seller; contracting is impossible before this date. Inability to
contract at earlier dates may reect a range of reasons: the buyer may be entirely unaware of the
sellers existence before encountering an advertisement which explains the mechanism, or he may
be aware of the sellers o¤er but unable to communicate until the opportunity arises to physically
meet.5
Payo¤s. At each date after arrival, if the buyer purchases a good of quality q at date t, paying
p, then he earns a date t payo¤
;tq   p
where ;t 2  is his value at date t, and where  is a bounded subset of R+ representing the set of
possible buyer values for quality. If the buyer does not purchase the good at date t and makes no
payment, then he earns a payo¤ equal to zero in that period.
The seller has a (per-period) cost of producing q units equal to c (q), where c () is a continuously-
di¤erentiable cost function dened on [0; q]. The cost function c () is strictly increasing, strictly
convex, and satises c0 (0) = c (0) = 0 and c0 (q) > sup.6 (A helpful example of such a cost function
puts c (q) = q
2
2 up to some bound q > sup; this renders closed-form solutions for optimal qualities
in Proposition 1 below.) The seller then earns a period t payo¤ from selling q units at price p equal
to p  c (q) (the sellers date t payo¤ in case making no sale at date t, and receiving no payment, is
equal to zero).
Distribution of buyer arrival dates. The probability of arrival at each date  is   0,
with
PT
=1   1. For each  , let  =
P 1
s=1 s be the probability that the buyer arrives before
date  . (It is worth emphasizing that, in case 1 = 1 and t = 0 for t  2, then the model will be
identical to that in Battaglini, 2005. As indicated above, the key novelty in our setting will be that
the buyers arrival time is instead random.)
Process for values: In the main text, we consider the case where the buyer has two possible
values for the good, leaving the case of a continuum of values to Appendix B. Hence,  = fL; Hg,
with 0 < L < H (L is the "low value", while H is the "high value"). We adopt the following
notation: if the buyer arrives at date  , then a sequence of values from date t to t0 > t, with t   ,
is denoted t
0
;t =
 
;t; : : : ; ;t0

.
The processes we consider satisfy the following restriction, which is particularly important for
keeping the sellers problem tractable. The distribution of the buyers value at each date after his
arrival depends only on his value in the previous period, and neither on his earlier values nor on his
5Our notion of arrival is distinct from other notions that one might be tempted to use, such as the date a buyer
rst learns his value for the good. See Akan, Ata and Dana (2015) for a model where a buyer learns his value at
di¤erent dates.
6The latter assumption will guarantee that the solutions to the optimal quality schedules that we derive below
remain strictly below q.
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arrival date.7 This implies that, at any date t, the period-t value ;t is a su¢ cient statistic for later
values.
If the buyer arrives at date  , then he draws a value ; 2 fL; Hg. The probability of drawing
a high date- value is given by Pr

~; = H

=  2 (0; 1). Values at each date t >  are determined
by the transitions Pr

~;t = H j~;t 1 = L

= L 2 (0; 1) and Pr

~;t = H j~;t 1 = H

= H 2
(0; 1), with L < H . Thus, a high value at any date implies a greater likelihood of high values at
future dates (put di¤erently, the process satises the rst-order stochastic dominance assumption
which is common in the literature).
Mechanisms. Both the buyers arrival time and the evolution of his value are his private
information. The seller can fully commit to a dynamic mechanism. By the revelation principle,
we restrict attention to incentive-compatible direct mechanisms. The buyer is asked to report his
arrival date  and initial value ; , and then to report his subsequent values ;t in each period
t >  . If the buyer arrives at date  , then he can report to the mechanism at any moment from
that date onwards.
A mechanism 
 = hq;pi is a collection of allocation rules q = hq;ti1t and payments p =
hp;ti1t. If the buyer reports to the mechanism at date  , and then reports a sequence of values
^
t
 ; =

^; ; : : : ; ^;t

2 t  , then he receives the quality q;t

^
t
 ;

2 [0; q] and pays p;t

^
t
 ;

2 R
at date t. A buyer who reports to the mechanism at date  is deemed to accept the o¤er and binds
himself to participate at all future dates. A buyer who never participates in the mechanism earns a
total discounted payo¤ equal to zero.
As is the case elsewhere in the literature, given that we impose no cash constraints, our as-
sumption that the buyer can fully commit comes at no loss of generality. Indeed, by appropriately
structuring the timing of payments so that the buyers continuation payo¤ in the mechanism is
never negative, the buyer can always be induced to continue participating at every subsequent date,
irrespective of his realized values.
3 Analysis and results
Consider the process dened above where the buyer has two possible values for the good. Fix a
mechanism 
 = hq;pi and consider a buyer who reports to the mechanism at date  , makes reports
^
t 1
; up to date t  1 (if any) and has a date t valuation ;t. The expected continuation payo¤ of
this buyer if he plans to report truthfully at all future dates is
V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

 E
"
TX
s=t
s t

;s q;s

^
t 1
; ;
~
s
;t

  p;s

^
t 1
; ;
~
s
;t

j ~;t = ;t
#
.
7As a result of this restriction, our analysis cannot be directly applied to settings where the evolution of preferences
is di¤erent for di¤erent cohorts of buyers.
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Using the same arguments as in Battaglini (2005), we can establish the following useful result con-
cerning how the buyers continuation payo¤ at any date t depends on his date t value. To state it,
we introduce the following notation: for any k 2 f1; : : : ; Tg, kL = (L; : : : ; L) is a sequence of low
values of length k.
Lemma 1 (Battaglini, 2005) Fix an incentive-compatible mechanism 
, and consider a buyer
who rst reports at date  , and then reports a sequence ^
t 1
; up to date t   1 (or makes no reports
in case t = ). The buyers expected payo¤ satises
V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

  V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

 (H   L)
TX
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

. (1)
Lemma 1 provides a lower bound on the additional payo¤ the buyer expects when his value is
high rather than low at a given date t. One way to interpret the condition is as follows. First,
suppose we adjust payments at dates t + 1 onwards so that the payo¤s satisfy (1) with equality at
all such dates, and for all histories. Assuming the new mechanism is incentive compatible at dates
t+1 onwards, the buyer is then willing to always report a low value at all such dates. We can then
evaluate the buyers incentive to misreport at date t under the assumption that he always reports
a low value in future. A necessary condition for incentive compatibility at date t is then that the
buyer expects a payo¤ from a high value at date t (i.e., V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

) which exceeds that for a low
value (i.e., V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

) by more than the expected di¤erence in valuations under a strategy of
always reporting a low value. The right-hand side of (1) is this di¤erence.
Next, we must go beyond Battaglinis (2005) analysis to deduce a lower bound on V 
; (L; ;)
(i.e., on the buyers payo¤ when participating at date  with a low value) in an incentive-compatible
and individually-rational mechanism.8 Here, we use the following requirement. A buyer who arrives
at date  with a value L must prefer to participate at date  rather than to delay participation until
date  + 1, then reporting truthfully at all future dates. That is, for all dates  ,
V 
; (L; ;)  
 
(1  L)V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + LV 
+1;+1 (H ; ;)

. (2)
Note that the simplicity of this participation constraint follows from our Markovian assumption that
the buyers current value is a su¢ cient statistic for the evolution of his future values. In particular,
a buyer who arrives at date  but participates at date  + 1 faces the same problem as a buyer who
in fact arrives at date  + 1 (conditional on his date  + 1 value being either low or high).
Condition (2), together with the one given in Lemma 1, yields the following result.
8 In Battaglinis (2005) paper, the only relevant participation date is  = 1, and the optimal mechanism sets
V 
1;1 (L; ;) = 0.
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Lemma 2 Fix an incentive-compatible mechanism 
 = hq;pi. The expected payo¤ of a buyer who
arrives at date  with a low value must satisfy
V 
; (L; ;)  L (H   L)
T X
i=1
TX
s=+i
s  (H   L)s  i q+i;s
 
s  i+1L

: (3)
Lemma 2 provides a lower bound on payo¤s that will turn out to be tight in the optimal mech-
anism (under a certain regularity condition to be specied momentarily). To begin understanding
this expression, it is simplest to consider the case where T is nite. Since the buyer must be willing
to participate if he arrives at date T with a low value, we have V 
T;T (L; ;)  0. Now consider
the buyer who arrives at date  = T   1 with value L. If the buyer chooses not to participate
at T   1, then he will have the option to participate at date T with a high value with probabil-
ity L. In this case, he earns a positive rent V 
T;T (H ; ;), which is at least (H   L) qT;T (L)
by (1). Hence, we have V 
T 1;T 1 (L; ;)  L (H   L) qT;T (L), which is (3) evaluated at
 = T   1. We can then work recursively backwards to deduce lower bounds on the rents at
earlier dates. For instance, to deduce a lower bound V 
T 2;T 2 (L; ;), we observe that, if the buyer
delays participation until the subsequent period, then he earns a rent V 
T 1;T 1 (L; ;) (which is at
least L (H   L) qT;T (L)) in case his value remains low (with probability 1   L), or this plus
an additional rent V 
T 1;T 1 (H ; ;)   V 
T 1;T 1 (L; ;) satisfying (1) if his value turns high (with
probability L).
Expression (3) is central to our analysis, for it shows how the rent that must be promised to
ensure agent participation accumulates with time. When T is nite, the agent, in deciding whether
to participate at date T , faces the usual outside option of not purchasing (which has payo¤ zero).
As just explained, ensuring participation at date T  1 requires ceding larger rents because the agent
can wait for his value to increase at date T . In turn, this raises the rents that must be promised to
ensure participation at T   2.
In terms of characterizing the optimal mechanism, the value of Lemma 2 is that it allows us
to nd a convenient lower bound on buyer payo¤s as a function of the quality allocations q. In
particular, Lemmas 1 and 2 together allow us to provide an upper bound on the achievable prot
in an incentive-compatible mechanism, as stated in the next result. This bound coincides with
the sellers prots in case all the inequalities in (1) and (3) hold as equalities. This upper bound,
analogous to the virtual surplus in static mechanism design, turns out to be achievable under a
mild condition on the arrival probability, which we describe below.
Lemma 3 Suppose that 
 is an incentive-compatible, individually-rational mechanism implementing
an allocation q. Then expected prots are no greater than
E
"
TX
s=~
s 1

ms~

~
s
~;~

q~;s

~
s
~;~

  c

q~;s

~
s
~;~
#
, (4)
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where, for all  , and all s   ,
ms
 
s +1L

= L  



L
1   +

1  

H   L
1  L
s 
(H   L) , and
ms
 
s;

= ;s for all s; 6= s +1L , (5)
and where expectations are taken over the arrival time ~ , as well as the realized values ~
T
~;~ .
It will be helpful to understand the virtual values ms in (5) as the surplus due to awarding
additional quality at date s to a buyer who arrived at date  , less the e¤ect on the lowest feasible
values of buyer rents. Condition (1) shows that the (lower bound on) additional rent a buyer
expects when arriving with a high rather than a low value, i.e. V 
; (H ; ;)   V 
; (L; ;) for arrival
date  , depends only on the quality at histories where the buyers value remains low. In turn, the
bound on rents in (3) also depends only on the quality at these histories. Hence, at any history
s; 6= s +1L , the virtual value corresponds simply to the buyers value for quality ;s (note that the
same observation is made also in Battaglinis, 2005, paper; although, as noted, that paper considers
only a single participation date, say  = 1).
For any history s; where the buyer arrives at date  and his value remains low until s, the
virtual value of incremental quality is the buyers value L less a quantity that can be rewritten as
L (H   L)s  (H   L) +  (H   L)s  (H   L)
 (1  ) (1  L)s 
. (6)
Analogous to the distortion term in the virtual values of static mechanism design, this expres-
sion is the ratio of the e¤ect of date-s quality q;s
 
s +1L

on buyer rents to the probability this
quality is awarded. The second term in the numerator (i.e.,  (H   L)s  (H   L)) corre-
sponds to the additional expected rents if the buyer happens to arrive at date  with a high (rather
than a low) value, an event which occurs with probability . The rst term in the numerator
(i.e., L (H   L)s  (H   L)) corresponds to the e¤ect of increasing q;s
 
s +1L

on the rents
earned in case of arrival at date    1 or earlier (the probability of such an arrival time is  , and
how much rent the buyer expects at such dates depends on the rate at which a low value turns high,
L, as explained in relation to Lemma 2). The denominator in (6) (i.e.,  (1  ) (1  L)s  ) is
simply the probability that the history s; = 
s +1
L occurs.
One can now choose the qualities which maximize the expression (4), and then verify that these
qualities can be implemented as part of an incentive-compatible mechanism. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for all   T  1, m+1+1 (L)  m+1
 
2L

. Prot-maximizing qualities
q;s are given, for each arrival date  , each date s   , and each s; , by
c0
 
q;s
 
s;

= max

ms
 
s;

; 0
	
. (7)
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The proof proceeds by constructing a mechanism with allocations given by (7), such that all
of the inequalities in (1) and (3) hold with equality. Buyer rents are then as small as possible for
an incentive-compatible individually-rational mechanism implementing these allocations (implying
that the upper bound on prots in (4) is attained). Given that the allocations (7) maximize the
expression in (4), the mechanism must maximize prots provided it is incentive compatible.9
Optimal qualities balance the cost of providing a given quality level against the virtual value
of provision introduced in Lemma 3. As discussed above, following sequences of low values, virtual
values are less than the value to the buyer, capturing ex-ante expected buyer rents.
The allocation q1;t which applies when the buyer arrives at date  = 1 is exactly the allocation
that the seller would optimally choose in a problem where the buyer is known to arrive at date 1.
Hence the allocation for a date-1 arrival is precisely the same as in Battaglinis (2005) paper, which
did not study uncertain arrival times. This result is to be expected, since the allocation for date-1
arrival does not a¤ect the rents that must be left in case of arrival after date 1. The only di¤erence
between the mechanism for  = 1 in the present setting, and the one studied by Battaglini, lies in
the prices paid (equivalently, the rent obtained) by the buyer. In the present setting, the buyers
payments must be lower so that the buyer is willing to participate at date 1 rather than delaying
participation.
For arrival at dates  > 1, the optimal qualities at histories of low values, i.e. q;t
 
t +1L

, are
further distorted below rst-best values. In particular, q;+k

k+1L

 q1;1+k

k+1L

for all   2
and k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T   g. These additional distortions reect the sellers goal of reducing rents
in case of arrival at a later date, in turn permitting a reduction of rents in case of earlier arrival
(including possible arrival at date 1).
Note that Proposition 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for the incentive compatibility of our
candidate mechanism in terms of the primitives of the problem. In particular, the assumption that
m+1+1 (L)  m+1
 
2L

is equivalent to
+1
+1
L
1   +

1   
H   L
1  L (


L
1   +

1  ): (8)
This condition guarantees that, for all   T   1 and all s 2 f + 1; : : : ; Tg,
q;s
 
s +1L
  q+1;s  s L  .
In other words, the assumption guarantees that a buyer receives a higher quality allocation if he
participates in the mechanism one period earlier, even if his values turn out to remain low from
9The proof of incentive compatibility can be viewed in two parts: (i) verifying the optimality of truthful reporting
of values after participating in the mechanism, and (ii) verifying that the buyer is always willing to participate in the
mechanism upon arrival. While the rst part is familiar from Battaglinis work, the second part is new to the present
paper.
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the date of arrival. This ensures that, if the buyers value is high, he expects a higher rent from
immediate participation than by delaying (that this is true also when the buyers value is low follows
because the mechanism is constructed to satisfy (3); i.e., the buyer is precisely indi¤erent between
participating and instead waiting one more period when his value is low).10
From (8), it is easy to see that our su¢ cient condition is more likely to hold in case  does
not decrease too fast in  or if the process is not too persistent, i.e. if H L1 L is small. It is always
enough that  is increasing in  . It is therefore worth emphasizing that


being increasing in 
is a condition that holds for many natural distributions of arrival times. Since the probability of
earlier arrival  is increasing in  , it su¢ ces that  is non-increasing. For instance, if T is nite
with  =
1
T for all  , then


=    1. If arrivals are geometrically distributed with parameter
 2 (0; 1), i.e.  = (1  ) 1  for all  , then  =
P 1
s=1 (1  )s  .
If  decreases too fast in  , then prots equal to the the maximum of (4) may not be attainable
in an incentive-compatible mechanism. In this case, one must resort to ironing to derive the
optimal allocation. Roughly speaking, this requires raising the quality after histories of low values
for earlier arrivals, and lowering them for later arrivals, as compared to the quality levels specied
in (7). We do not study the ironed solution, but expect our key qualitative insights to carry over to
settings where ironing is needed.
If  is increasing in  , then the weight the seller attributes to reducing the rent of earlier arrivals
increases over time relative to the weight she assigns to the surplus generated in case of arrival at date
 . Since buyer rents are determined by the qualities allocated in case the buyers value remains low,
this implies that these qualities are distorted downward more at later dates relative to the rst-best
levels. In particular, conditional on the buyer being in the relationship for the same length of time,
distortions are greater if the buyer arrives later. Formally, we nd the following.
Corollary 1 Suppose that  is increasing in  . Consider any two dates  ; 
0, with  <  0, and let
k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T    0g. Then
q;+k

k+1L

 q 0; 0+k

k+1L

,
with a strict inequality in case q;+k

k+1L

> 0. Moreover, if ; =  0; 0, then V 
; (; ; ;) 
V 
 0; 0
 
 0; 0 ; ;

, with a strict inequality if q;s
 
s +1L

> 0 for some period s   .
The result indicates that, when  is increasing with  , late arrivals are punished in that they
expect lower rents. This discourages delayed participation in the mechanism, allowing the seller to
10Formally, the high types participation constraint (which is the constraint that the mechanism is shown to satisfy
in the Appendix) is simply
V 
; (H ; ;)  

(1  H)V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + HV 
+1;+1 (H ; ;)

,
analogous to the participation constraint (2) for the low type.
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extract more rents from early arrivals. In particular, the quality choices are designed to discourage
a buyer who arrives with a low value from delaying participation until his value becomes high. It
therefore allows the seller to give up less rent in case of earlier arrival while inducing immediate
participation.
When T = +1, and when the buyer arrives with positive probability at each date, the ratio


necessarily approaches +1 with  . As a consequence, we nd that contracts become arbitrarily
ine¢ cient as the participation date grows large along histories where the buyer realizes only the low
value L.
Corollary 2 Suppose that T = +1, with m+1+1 (L)  m+1
 
2L

for all  (a su¢ cient condition is
that  is increasing in ). For any s, there exists  su¢ ciently large that q

;t
 
t +1L

= 0 for all
   and all t such that t    s. Hence, buyer rents converge to zero with the participation date.
What emerges then is a fairly robust principle that optimal mechanisms punish a late arrival.
When the horizon is innite, for instance, buyer rents become arbitrarily small with the participation
date. Punishing very late arrivals is benecial for the seller, since it permits a reduction in rents at
all earlier dates, back to date 1.
In contrast, it is worth noting that the vanishing distortions at the bottomprinciple described
by Battaglini (2005) continues to hold. In particular, we can show the following.
Corollary 3 Suppose that T = +1 with m+1+1 (L)  m+1
 
2L

for all  (a su¢ cient condition is
that  is increasing in ). For any arrival date  , q

;t
 
t +1L

converges to its e¢ cient value L
as the length of the relationship t   + 1 becomes large.
The reason for this result is that quality choices at dates long after contracting have little e¤ect
on the buyers rents; choosing qualities close to the e¢ cient ones therefore costs the seller little in
terms of the surplus that must be left to the buyer. This is easily seen from the inequality (1) in
Lemma 1. According to this lemma, the additional rents that must be given to the buyer in case of
arrival with a high value depends on the additional probability that the buyer has of a high value in
future. Since H   L < 1, the additional probability of a high value vanishes with time, so later
quality allocations a¤ect the buyers rents less (see Battaglini, 2005, for a more detailed explanation
of the vanishing distortions property).
Finally, it is interesting to consider comparative statics on the transition probabilities. Virtual
values and hence qualities for sequences of low values are decreasing in H . The reason is that, for
higher H , a high value persists for a longer time, implying that qualities assigned for sequences of
low values have a greater e¤ect on the rents that must be left to the buyer in case his value is initially
high (again, see the inequalities in (1) of Lemma 1). The parameter L, however, plays two roles.
First, a higher value of L implies a smaller advantage of high values over low ones, i.e. the opposite
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e¤ect as for H (see the inequalities in (1)). Second, it increases the likelihood that the buyers
value becomes high if his value is low and he delays participation in the mechanism. This in turn
increases the option value of delaying participation. The sellers optimal response to the rst e¤ect
is to increase qualities, while her optimal response to the second is the opposite. Whether qualities
increase or decrease with L at any date then depends on parameters and the participation date.
3.1 Experience goods
One subtlety which we have so far overlooked is the possibility that the buyers value evolves dif-
ferently when consuming the good compared to when he is without it. For experience goods,
for instance, a buyer may learn about suitability through consumption, but otherwise learn only a
little. More generally, the level of excitement a buyer has about a good (and the importance of high
quality, in particular) might be expected to uctuate di¤erently depending on whether the buyer is
consuming. In terms of our model, this means values switching at di¤erent rates before and after
participating in the mechanism.
Let WH and 
W
L ; with 
W
L < 
W
H ; denote the probabilities of a high value at date  given,
respectively, high and low values at date    1 when not consuming at    1. Maintain the existing
notation for the probability of changes conditional on consumption (i.e., let H and L denote the
probabilities of a high value at date t given high and low values when consuming at date t  1). The
previous analysis is easily adapted to this setting, yielding the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that  is increasing in  . Suppose that values evolve di¤erently contingent
on past consumption, as described above. Let virtual values be given, for all  , all s   , by
mW;s
 
s +1L

= L  



WL
1   +

1  

H   L
1  L
s 
(H   L) , and
mW;s
 
s;

= ;s for all s; 6= s +1L :
Prot-maximizing qualities qW;s are given, for each arrival date  , each date s   , and each s; , by
c0
 
qW;s
 
s;

= max

mW;s
 
s;

; 0
	
. (9)
A natural assumption is that WL < L, with the implication that quality allocations are less
distorted than those given in Proposition 1. In the extreme case where WL = 0, optimal allocations
do not depend on the arrival date. The buyer earns no additional rents from his private information
about arrival  i.e., a buyer who arrives with a low value expects zero rent irrespective of the
arrival date. It is readily checked that the optimal qualities then coincide with those for the optimal
mechanism with a known arrival date (as in Battaglini, 2005; equivalently, optimal qualities are the
same as for date-1 arrival in Proposition 1). Otherwise, for WL > 0, our main qualitative predictions
continue to hold; in particular, a buyer whose initial value is low expects positive rent, and (provided
that  is increasing in ) quality allocations are less e¢ cient the later the arrival date.
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4 Conclusions
This paper considered dynamic mechanism design in a setting where buyers arrive over time and
where their preferences evolve stochastically. We provided an approach to fully characterize the
optimal mechanism. The key nding was that the mechanism punishes a late participant: late
participants face tougher terms of trade and therefore purchase lower qualities and receive less rent.
Early arrivals fare better, and buyers earn positive expected rents even if their values are equal
to the lowest. Although later arrivals receive less e¢ cient allocations for longer, the principle of
vanishing distortions, by which allocations converge to rst-best levels with time in the relationship,
can continue to apply (for instance, it does so in Battaglinis, 2005, Markovian setting).
Our ndings can be expected to have relevance for a broad class of agency relationships beyond
the setting of the paper. For instance, a government seeking to procure services at the least cost
to tax payers may face new suppliers arising over time whose production costs can be expected to
change. Firms seeking to ll top management positions may face potential managers who become
available or learn of the position only after time, while their suitability for the job continues to
change. Our focus on the sellers problem with vertical preferences over quality (as in Mussa and
Rosen (1978)) was thus only for convenience, and because it allowed us to draw comparisons to
the existing literature, especially Battaglini (2005) and subsequent work (e.g., Boleslavsky and Said
(2012) and Battaglini and Lamba (2015)). Of course, long-term contracts in various settings may
be shaped by considerations specic to each and so di¤erent applications may call for further study.
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A Appendix: Proofs of results for two-value case (main text)
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a buyer who at date t has reported ^
t 1
; from date  up to date
t  1. That the buyer must be willing to report truthfully a date t value H implies
V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

  V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

 (H   L) q;t

^
t 1
; ; L

(A.1)
+ (H   L)

V 
;t+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; L

  V 
;t+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; L

.
Suppose that
V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

  V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

 (H   L)
t0X
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

+t
0 t+1 (H   L)t
0 t+1

V 
;t0+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; 
t0 t+1
L

  V 
;t0+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; 
t0 t+1
L

holds for some t0 > t. Using (A.1) to substitute for the nal term then yields
V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

  V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

 (H   L)
t00X
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

+t
00 t+1 (H   L)t
00 t+1

V 
;t00+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; 
t00 t+1
L

  V 
;t00+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; 
t00 t+1
L

for t00 = t0 + 1. The result then follows by induction and (for the case of T = +1) the observa-
tion that, in an incentive-compatible mechanism, V 
;s+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

 V 
;s+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

must be uniformly bounded for all s  t.
Proof of Lemma 2. For an incentive-compatible mechanism 
 and any date  , the buyers
expected payo¤ must satisfy
V 
; (L; ;)  
 
(1  L)V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + LV 
+1;+1 (H ; ;)

= 
 
V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + L
 
V 
+1;+1 (H ; ;)  V 
+1;+1 (L; ;)

 
 
V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + L (H   L)
TX
s=+1
s  1 (H   L)s  1 q+1;s
 
s L
!
,
where the nal equality follows from Lemma 1. The same inequality holds also for V 
+1;+1 (L; ;).
Hence,
V 
; (L; ;)  L (H   L)
TX
s=+1
s  1 (H   L)s  1 q+1;s
 
s L

+2L (H   L)
TX
s=+2
s  2 (H   L)s  2 q+2;s
 
s  1L

+2V 
+2;+2 (L; ;) .
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The result then follows from induction, and the fact that V 
 0; 0 (L; ;) remains bounded uniformly
over  0 >  .
Proof of Lemma 3. First note that the buyers expected rent is given by
TX
=1
 1
 
V 
; (H ; ;) + (1  )V 
; (L; ;)

=
TX
=1
 1V


; (L; ;) + 
TX
=1
 1
 
V 
; (H ; ;)  V 
; (L; ;)

.
The rst term reects the rent that the buyer expects to earn even if his value is low at the arrival
date, while the second term reects the additional rent he expects if his value is instead high. A
lower bound for the rst term is available from Lemma 2:
TX
=1
 1V


; (L; ;)  L (H   L)
TX
=2
TX
s=
s 1 (H   L)s  q;s
 
s +1L

.
A lower bound for the second term is available from simply substituting the expression in Lemma 1:

TX
=1
 1
 
V 
; (H ; ;)  V 
; (L; ;)
   (H   L) TX
=1

 
TX
s=
s 1 (H   L)s  q;s
 
s +1L
!
.
Therefore, the rents that a buyer is expected to earn must be at least
TX
=1
TX
s=
s 1 (L +  ) (H   L) (H   L)s  q;s
 
s +1L

.
The expression for prots in the lemma is then simply the expected surplus less the lower bound on
buyer expected rents.
Proof of Proposition 1. The allocations q =
 
q;t

1t are chosen to maximize (4). (A
unique optimum exists by convexity of the cost function c ().) It remains to verify the existence of
a system of transfers p which implements q as part of an incentive-compatible mechanism. To this
end, we begin by specifying the payo¤ that the buyer expects from truthful reporting at each date t
following any history of reports ^
t 1
; from date  . We choose these payo¤s so that the inequalities
(1) and (3) hold with equality, which in turn implies that the buyers expected rents are as small
as possible in an incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanism implementing q. This
means that expected prots are equal to the expression in (4).
There is still much freedom in how payo¤s are spread across time. One possible specication is
as follows: At each date  of rst reporting
V 
; (L; ;) = L (H   L)
T X
i=1
i
 
TX
s=+i
s  i (H   L)s  i q+i;s
 
s  i+1L
!
.
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For each t >  , and each history of reports ^
t 1
; , V


;t

L; ^
t 1
;

= 0. For each  , each t   , and
each ^
t 1
; ,
V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

= V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

+ (H   L)
TX
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

.
Next, one can choose prices to ensure that these payo¤s are realized if the buyer reports truthfully.
This is achieved if, for each  , each t   and each ^t 1; , we let
p;t

^
t 1
; ; ;t

= ;tq

;t

^
t 1
; ; ;t

  V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

+ E
h
V 
;t+1

~;t+1; ^
t 1
; ; ;t

j;t
i
.
Now, we wish to check that the mechanism hq;pi, with p =  p;t1t is incentive compat-
ible. Two kinds of incentive constraints must be checked. First, conditional on the buyer having
reported to the mechanism, he must be willing to report his values truthfully (checking these con-
straints requires arguments akin to those in Battaglini, 2005; see footnote 9 for further discussion).
Second, he must be willing to participate in the mechanism and report to it immediately on the date
of his arrival.
Truthful reporting of values. By the one-shot deviation principleof Blackwell (1965), it
is enough to check that one-shot deviations from truth-telling are never optimal, for any history of
past reports. Because the process is rst-order Markov, the payo¤s available to the buyer at any
date t depend only on his date t value ;t, and the past reports ^t 1; , and not on any previous
values. Verifying that the buyer does not prot from a one-shot deviation when his value is high
amounts to verifying (A.1), which holds by construction. Verifying that the buyer does not prot
from a one-shot deviation when his value is low amounts to checking
V 
;t

L; ^
t 1
;

 V 
;t

H ; ^
t 1
;

  (H   L) q;t

^
t 1
; ; H

  (H   L)

V 
;t+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; H

  V 
;t+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; H

.
That (1) holds with equality at all histories implies that this is equivalent to
(H   L)
TX
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

 (H   L) q;t

^
t 1
; ; H

+  (H   L)

V 
;t+1

H ; ^
t 1
; ; H

  V 
;t+1

L; ^
t 1
; ; H

= (H   L)
TX
s=t
s t (H   L)s t q;s

^
t 1
; ; H ; 
s t
L

.
This is satised because, for all  , t and s, with   t  s, and all ^t 1; , q;s

^
t 1
; ; H ; 
s t
L


q;s

^
t 1
; ; 
s t+1
L

.
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Timely participation. The above implies that, if the buyer participates at date  , he then
reports his values truthfully from then on, and therefore expects to earn the payo¤s specied above.
Since transition probabilities do not depend on the buyers arrival date to the market, the buyers
problem of whether to participate is identical irrespective of his true arrival date. Specifying that
the buyer participates at every opportunity, we can then check that the buyer does not gain from
one-shot deviations, i.e. from delaying participation. This follows when the buyers value is low by
(2), which is satised by construction.
For a high value, we need to check
V 
; (H ; ;)  
 
(1  H)V 
+1;+1 (L; ;) + HV 
+1;+1 (H ; ;)

.
This is equivalent to
(H   L) q; (L) + (H   L)
TX
s=+1
s  (H   L)s 
 
q;s
 
s +1L
  q+1;s  s L   0. (A.2)
It is readily checked that, for all   T   1, m+1+1 (L)  m+1
 
2L

implies ms+1
 
s L
 
ms
 
s +1L

for all s   + 1. Therefore, q+1;s
 
s +1L
  q;s  s +1L  for all s   + 1, so
that (A.2) is indeed satised.
Proof of Corollary 1. The rst part follows directly from the qualities specied in Proposition
1. The second part follows using these optimal qualities and the fact that the buyer payo¤s at the
participation/arrival date V; (; ; ;) satisfy the inequalities (1) and (3) with equality.
Proof of Corollary 2. The rst part follows directly from the qualities specied in Proposition
1. The implication for buyer rents follows using the optimal qualities and the fact that the buyer
payo¤s at the participation/arrival date V; (; ; ;) satisfy the inequalities (1) and (3) with equality.
Proof of Corollary 3. This follows immediately from the qualities specied in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The lower bound (3) in Lemma 2 becomes
V 
; (L; ;)  WL (H   L)
T X
i=1
TX
s=+i
s  (H   L)s  i q+i;s
 
s  i+1L

:
Together with the inequalities in Lemma 1 one obtains a lower bound on buyer expected rents. This
allows us to derive the upper bound on expected prots
E
"
TX
s=~
s 1

mW;s~

~
s
~;~

q~;s

~
s
~;~

  c

q~;s

~
s
~;~
#
,
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with virtual values mW;s given in the present result. One then chooses qualities to maximize this
expression and then proposes an appropriate implementation as in the proof of Proposition 1. In
particular, one should specify payments such that all incentive (and individual rationality) constraints
bind, and can than specify that, for each t >  , and each history of reports ^
t 1
; , V


;t

L; ^
t 1
;

= 0.
Verifying that the buyer, having chosen to participate in the mechanism, is willing to report all
values truthfully follows the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1. It then remains to verify
the buyers willingness to participate at his arrival date. By construction, he is indi¤erent to doing
so when his value is low. When his value is high, it is enough to verify that
(H   L)
TX
s=
s  (H   L)s  qW;s
 
s +1L

  WH   WL  (H   L) TX
s=+1
s  (H   L)s  1 qW+1;s
 
s L

.
That this is satised follows because WH   WL  1, and because  is increasing in  . The latter
guarantees that qW;s
 
s +1L
  qW+1;s+1  s +1L  for all s  T   1.
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B Appendix: Continuum of values
This appendix provides results for a continuum of values. The process for arrivals is as described in
the model set-up. The key di¤erence will be that, in each period t after arrival, the buyer draws a
value from  =

; 

. The buyers initial type ; at arrival date  is drawn from a continuously
di¤erentiable c.d.f. FIn with density fIn and full support on .
For each date t >  , if the buyers date t  1 value is ;t 1 2 , then his date-t value is drawn
according to a continuously di¤erentiable c.d.f. FTr (j;t 1) with density fTr (j;t 1) and with
support on

Tr (;t 1) ; Tr (;t 1)
  . The function FTr (j) is also continuously di¤erentiable
in its second argument. Following Garrett and Pavan (2012), we specify that, for any ;t 1; ;t 2 ,
 fTr (;tj;t 1)  @FTr (;tj;t 1)
@;t 1
 0.
The second inequality implies that the conditional distributions FTr (;tj;t 1) are ranked in terms
of rst-order stochastic dominance, while the rst inequality ensures that we can apply a dynamic
revenue equivalenceresult developed in Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014).11
Following Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014), we introduce the notion of impulse responses. For
any  , t, s, with   t < s, and any s;t, let
Jst
 
s;t
  sl=t+1 @FTr(;lj;l 1)=@;l 1fTr(;lj;l 1)

.
If instead s = t, then Jst
 
s;t

= J tt (;t) = 1. The value of the impulse response J
s
t
 
s;t

can be
interpreted as capturing the e¤ect of an innitesimal variation in ;t on ;s. A simple example
is any rst-order autoregressive process with persistence parameter , in which case the impulse
responses are independent of valuations and given by Jst = 
s t. A property that is helpful for
understanding the impulse response function is that, given   t < s,
@
@;t
E
h
~;sj~;t = ;t
i
= E
h
Jst

~
s
;t

j~;t = ;t
i
.
As for the two-type case, the buyers expected payo¤ from truthful reporting in a mechanism

 = hq;pi is denoted V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

. The following analog to Lemma 1 then determines how, if
the mechanism is incentive compatible, the buyers expected payo¤must depend on his value at each
date.
Lemma B.1 (Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2014) Fix an incentive-compatible mechanism 
, and
consider a buyer who rst reports at date  , and then reports a sequence ^
t 1
; up to date t   1 (or
11As noted in Garrett and Pavan (2012), the lower bound on
@FTr(tjt 1)
@t 1 is equivalent to the assumption that, for
any t 1 2 , and any x 2 R, 1  F (t 1 + xjt 1) is nonincreasing in t 1.
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makes no reports in case t = ). If the buyers value at date t is ;t, then his expected payo¤ satises
V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

= V 
;t

; ^
t 1
;

+
Z ;t

E
"
TX
s=t
s tJst

~
s
;t

q;s

^
t 1
; ;
~
s
;t

j~;t = r
#
dr.
Proof of Lemma B.1. This follows immediately from Theorem 1 of Pavan, Segal and Toikka
(2014).
Our goal is to use this result to derive a lower bound on the buyers expected payo¤when arriving
at any date  , as in Lemma 2 for the two-type case. To do this we consider the incentive of a buyer
who arrives at date  with the lowest possible initial value  to misreport his arrival date by delaying
participation until the following period. For this deviation to be unprotable requires
V 
; (; ;)  E
h
V 
+1;+1

~;+1; ;

j~; = 
i
. (B.1)
Iterating this requirement yields the following result.
Lemma B.2 Fix an incentive-compatible mechanism 
 = hq;pi. The buyers expected payo¤ for
any arrival date  must satisfy
V 
; (; ;) 
T X
i=1
E
241  FTr

~+i;+ij

fIn

~+i;+i
 TX
t=+i
t J t+i

~
t
+i;+i

q+i;t

~
t
+i;+i
35 . (B.2)
Proof of Lemma B.2. By (B.1), for any  ,
V 
; (; ;)  V 
+1;+1 (; ;)
+E
"Z ~;+1

E
"
TX
t=+1
t J t+1

~
t
+1;+1

q+1;t

~
t
+1;+1

j ~+1;+1 = r
#
dr j ~; = 
#
= V 
+1;+1 (; ;)
+E
241  FTr

~;+1j

fTr

~;+1j
 TX
t=+1
t J t+1

~
t
+1;+1

q+1;t

~
t
+1;+1

j ~; = 
35
= V 
+1;+1 (; ;)
+E
241  FTr

~+1;+1j

fIn

~+1;+1
 TX
t=+1
t J t+1

~
t
+1;+1

q+1;t

~
t
+1;+1
 35 ,
where the rst equality follows from integration by parts and the second by a simple rearrangement.
Iterating then yields (B.2).
Lemmas B.1 and B.2 can be used to provide the following analog of Lemma 3.
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Lemma B.3 Suppose that 
 is an incentive-compatible, individually-rational mechanism implement-
ing an allocation q. Then expected prots are no greater than
E
"
TX
t=~
s 1

mt~

~
t
~;~

q~;t

~
t
~;~

  c

q~;t

~
t
~;~
#
, (B.3)
where, for all  , all t   , and all t ; ,
mt
 
t ;

= ;t   J t
 
t ;


1  FTr (; j)
fIn (; )
+
1  FIn (; )
fIn (; )

, (B.4)
and where expectations are taken over the arrival time ~ , as well as the realized values ~
T
~;~ .
Proof of Lemma B.3. By Lemmas B.1 and B.2, the buyers expected rent conditional on
arriving at date  is at least
T X
i=1
E
241  FTr

~+i;+ij

fIn

~+i;+i
 TX
t=+i
t J t+i

~
t
+i;+i

q+i;t

~
t
+i;+i
35
+E
"Z ~;

E
"
TX
s=
s Js

~
s
;

q;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr
#
.
For each  , integrate the second term by parts and subtract the full expression for buyer expected
rents from the expected surplus. Taking expectations over the arrival date  then yields the result.
We choose qualities to maximize the expression in (B.3). Under certain conditions, we can then
nd an incentive-compatible mechanism which implements these allocations, implying the following
result.
Proposition B.1 Suppose that, (i) for all   T 1, and all pairs +1; , m+1+1 (;+1)  m+1
 
+1;

,
and (ii) for all  and all t   , each mt () is non-decreasing. Then prot-maximizing qualities are
given, for all  , all t   , and all t ; , by
c0
 
q;t
 
t ;

= max

mt
 
t ;

; 0
	
.
Proof of Proposition B.1. Since the qualities q;t are chosen to maximize (B.3), we need
only to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism which implements them. As for the proof of
Proposition 1, we begin by specifying the buyers expected payo¤s that the mechanism is to deliver
the buyer when he reports his values truthfully. For all  and all ; , let
V 
; (; ; ;) =
T X
i=1
E
241  FTr

~+i;+ij

fIn

~+i;+i
 TX
t=+i
t J t+i

~
t
+i;+i

q+i;t

~
t
+i;+i
35
+
Z ;

E
"
TX
s=
s Js

~
s
;

q;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr.
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For all  , all t >  , and all

^
t 1
; ; ;t

, let
V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

=
Z ;t

E
"
TX
s=t
s tJst

~
s
;t

q;s

^
t 1
; ;
~
s
;t

j~;t = r
#
dr:
We then specify the transfers p;t which deliver these payo¤s; i.e., we take
p;t

^
t 1
; ; ;t

= ;tq

;t

^
t 1
; ; ;t

  V 
;t

;t; ^
t 1
;

+ E
h
V 
;t+1

~;t+1; ^
t 1
; ; ;t

j;t
i
.
We now verify that the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible. First note that, since the
allocations q;t () are non-decreasing, Condition (iv) of Corollary 1 in Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014)
is satised, so the buyer must be willing to report his values truthfully conditional on participation.
This implies that the buyers expected payo¤ when participating at any date  with a value ; is
equal to
V 
; (; ; ;) = V 
; (; ;) +
Z ;

E
"
TX
s=
s Js

~
s
;

q;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr.
We use this in the remaining step, which is to check the incentive compatibility of immediate par-
ticipation at the buyers arrival date.
By the one-shot deviation principle, it su¢ ces to verify that the buyer is willing to participate
at an arbitrary date  . By delaying participation until the following period, the buyer expects a
payo¤, given ; , of
E
h
V 
+1;+1

~;+1; ;

j ~; = 
i
+
Z ;

E
"
TX
s=+1
s Js

~
s
;

q+1;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr.
By construction,
V 
; (; ;) = E
h
V 
+1;+1

~;+1; ;

j ~; = 
i
.
Therefore, a one-shot deviation at date  to delaying participation is unprotable ifZ ;

E
"
TX
s=
s Js

~
s
;

q;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr

Z ;

E
"
TX
s=+1
s Js

~
s
;

q+1;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr.
To see that this holds, we reason as follows. First consider our assumption that, for all  and all +1; ,
m+1+1 (;+1)  m+1
 
+1;

. This implies that, for all  , all s >  , and all s; , m
s
+1
 
s;+1
 
ms
 
s;

, and hence q+1;s
 
s;+1
  q;s  s;. That the inequality holds is then immediate from
the assumption that Js is non-negative (equivalently, that the distribution of values after date  are
ordered in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance).
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Conditions (i) and (ii) of this proposition can be understood as follows. First, Condition (ii)
guarantees the existence of a mechanism in which, once the buyer has accepted to participate, he
truthfully reports his values at all dates. As discussed by Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014), this
condition can be relaxed, although the weaker conditions are often di¢ cult to check. Condition (i)
then plays the role of ensuring that the allocations which maximize (B.3) are implementable by an
incentive-compatible mechanism in which the constraints in (B.2) are satised with equality.
Condition (i), which guarantees timely participation in the mechanism, is new relative to settings
where the agents arrival date is xed or known (as in Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2014, for instance).
The mechanism we construct ensures that the inequality (B.2) holds as an equality, which means
that the buyer is indi¤erent between participating and waiting to participate in the next period when
his value is equal to . Condition (i) then implies that, under the allocations which maximize (B.3),
immediate participation at date  is preferred by all higher types. More precisely, it implies that
the benet of immediate participation is increasing in the buyers date- value. Intuitively, this is
because earlier participation gives the buyer access to higher quality levels, for the same evolution
of his values (assuming these values are reported truthfully). Like Condition (ii), Condition (i) is
a kind of monotonicity condition  it implies monotonicity of the allocations in the participation
date. Like Condition (ii), it is somewhat stronger than required, but it is simple to state and a
natural analogue to the condition of Proposition 1 for the two-value case considered above.
At least when the conditions of Proposition B.1 hold, we are able to conrm the ndings in
Corollary 1. If  is increasing in  , then qualities are distorted further below the rst-best level at
later dates and the buyer expects less rent conditional on his value at arrival. A generalized principle
of vanishing distortionsalso applies, provided that the impulse response functions J t
 
t ;

vanish
uniformly over time.
We next provide examples of processes for which Proposition B.1 is satised.
Example B.1 Let  > 0, let FIn be the uniform distribution on

0; 

, and let  be a positive scalar.
For each  and each t >  , let ~;t = 
 
1  ~"t e ;t 1

, where ~"t  is a random variable distributed
uniformly on the unit interval. For each  , each t >  , and each t ; ,
mt
 
t ;

= ;t   t ts=
 
   s


+ 1

. (B.5)
The conditions of Proposition B.1 are satised provided that, for all  ,




+ 1

 +1
+1
+ 1. (B.6)
Proof of Example B.1 . For any  , t and (;t 1; "t  ), let z (;t 1; "t  ) = 
 
1  "t e ;t 1

.
For any sequence of values t ; , we may nd for each s 2 f + 1; : : : ; tg the shock "s  such that
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;s = 
 
1  "s e ;s 1

. Indeed, these are given by
"s  =
   ;s
e ;s 1
.
The chain rule yields that
J t
 
t ;

= ts=+1
@z (;s 1; "s  )
@;s 1
Hence,
J t
 
t ;

= ts=+1
"s e ;s 1
= t ts=+1
 
   ;s

.
Note also that, for  2 0; , FTr (j0) =   . Substituting in (B.4) yields (B.5). It is then easy
to see that Condition (ii) of Proposition B.1 is satised. That Condition (i) is satised follows from
(B.6).
Example B.1 is notable in that it typically includes a wide class of distributions for the arrival
date. If   1, for instance, then it is enough that  is non-decreasing in  , which is the condition
we emphasized for the two-value case. More generally, Condition (i) of Proposition B.1 is more likely
to hold if the process is not too persistent. In the above example, the impulse response function is
given, for any dates  , and t >  , by J t
 
t ;

= t ts=+1
 
   ;s

; thus  is a parameter which
indexes the persistence of the process and the condition holds more easily whenever  is small.
An important class of examples in the literature, beginning with Besanko (1985), concerns au-
toregressive processes. Suppose the buyers value evolves according to an autoregressive process,
with ~;t = ;t 1 + ~"t for some  2 (0; 1] and ~"t an independently distributed shock. In this
case, Condition (ii) is often straightforward to check, while Condition (i) is more di¢ cult, unless
restrictive assumptions are made on the distribution of arrivals. Condition (i) is easier to check
when there are two possible arrival dates, however, as in the following example.
Example B.2 Suppose that T = 2. Let FIn be the uniform distribution on  =

; 

, which
determines the distribution of ~1;1 and ~2;2. Let  2 (0; 1] and let G be a continuously di¤erentiable
c.d.f. on

 (1  ) ;  (1  ). Suppose that ~1;2 is distributed according to 1;1 + ~", where ~" is
distributed according to G. Then m11 (1;1) = 1;1   1 FIn(1;1)fIn(1;1) , m21
 
21;1

= 1;2    1 FIn(1;1)fIn(1;1) , and
m22 (2;2) = 2;2  1 FIn(2;2)fIn(2;2)  
1
2
1 G(2;2 )
fIn(2;2)
. Then both conditions of Proposition B.1 are satised.
Proof of Example B.2. Condition (ii) is simple to check. For Condition (i), note that, for
each possible 21,
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1  FIn (1;2)
fIn (1;2)
=    1;2
     1;1 +  (1  )
= 
 
   1;1

= 
1  FIn (1;1)
fIn (1;1)
.
Therefore, m22 (1;2)  1;2   1 FIn(1;2)fIn(1;2)  1;2   
1 FIn(1;1)
fIn(1;1)
= m21
 
21;1

, as required.
While verifying the conditions in Proposition B.1 can be di¢ cult, certain qualitative properties
of the optimal mechanism are quite robust. Indeed, under fairly general conditions (requiring neither
of the Conditions (i) or (ii) of Proposition B.1), we can establish a partial analogue of Corollary 2.
This describes how the agent fares for all su¢ ciently late participation dates.
Proposition B.2 Suppose that T = +1, with  > 0 for all  . Then the following are true of an
optimal mechanism:
(i) V; (; ;) converges to zero with  .
(ii) If, in addition, FTr(j) has full support on , then the buyers expected rents conditional
on participation at date  , E
h
V;

~; ; ;
i
, converge to zero with  .
Proof of Proposition B.2. We begin with Part (i). Suppose for a contradiction that there
exists " > 0 such that, for all  , there is some  >  with V; (; ;) > ". We consider excluding the
buyer after date  , and then reducing the buyers rents in case of arrival at date  or before. We
argue that this is possible in such a way that the reduction in (ex-ante) expected buyer rents exceeds
the (ex-ante) loss in surplus.
Let S = maxqfq   c(q)g be the upper bound on the surplus that is generated in each period.
The total (discounted life-time) surplus generated by a buyer who participates at some date s is no
greater than SL =
S
1  in date-s dollars. The contribution to ex-ante expected discounted surplus
from arrival after date  is therefore no greater than
 1
1X
s=+1
s
s SL  SL
1X
s=+1
s
=
S
1  
1X
s=+1
s:
Let R = V; (; ;) denote the rent expected conditional on arrival at date  with value . Con-
sider excluding participation in the mechanism after date  and charging an additional participation
fee equal to  tR in case of arrival at each date t   . The adjusted mechanism remains incentive
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compatible and induces immediate participation whenever the buyer arrives at date  or earlier. The
reduction in the ex-ante expected rent left to the buyer is at least  1R
P
s=1 s. The increase in
prots is therefore at least
 1R
X
s=1
s  
S
1  
1X
s=+1
s
=  1
 
R
X
s=1
s  
S
1  
1X
s=+1
s
!
. (B.7)
By assumption, we can pick  arbitrarily large and such that R = V; (; ;) > ". Hence, the
expression (B.7) can be assured strictly positive for  chosen su¢ ciently large. That is, prots are
higher under the new mechanism.
Now consider Part (ii). If this result does not hold, then there exists " > 0 such that we can
nd a sequence (k)
1
k=1 with the property that E
h
Vk;k

~k;k ; ;
i
 " for all k = 1; 2; : : : . First
note that Vk;k (k;k ; ;) is uniformly bounded over k and k;k 2 . Otherwise, by Lemma B.1
and the assumption that q  q, we must have Vk;k (; ;) is not uniformly bounded, contradicting
Part (i) of the proposition. Because E
h
Vk;k

~k;k ; ;
i
 " for all k, and because Vk;k (; ;)
is non-decreasing by Lemma B.1, we can hence nd ;  > 0 such that Vk;k (k;k ; ;) >  for
all k;k >    . The assumption that FTr (j) has full support on  then implies the exis-
tence of  such that E
h
Vk;k

~k 1;k ; ;

j~k 1;k 1 = 
i
>  for all k. Since Vk 1;k 1 (; ;) 
E
h
Vk;k

~k 1;k ; ;

j~k 1;k 1 = 
i
by the incentive constraint (B.1), we have established that
Vk 1;k 1 (; ;) remains bounded above  > 0, again contradicting Part (i) of the proposition.
For Part (i) of the proposition, the intuition is the familiar one: reducing rents at later dates
allows the seller to reduce rents also at all earlier dates, so the seller does well to pick V; (; ;) close
to zero for large  . However, this does not necessarily imply that V; (; ; ;) should vanish with
 for all ; . In particular, one can nd processes with () <  such that the buyer continues
to expect positive rent upon arrival with a value larger than () under an optimal mechanism.
Intuitively, the reason is that permitting the buyer a large rent for high initial values need not create
a valuable option for the buyer when he arrives in the previous period. For instance, such high
values might only be obtained at the buyers arrival date. The full-support assumption in Part (ii)
of the proposition guarantees that this does not happen.
Proposition B.2 also has implications for optimal qualities, which can be understood by exam-
ining Lemma B.1. In particular, note that
V 
; (; ; ;) = V 
; (; ;) +
Z ;

E
" 1X
s=
s Js

~
s
;

q;s

~
s
;

j~; = r
#
dr
under an optimal mechanism with allocation rule
 
q;t

1t. Hence, if FTr(j) has full support
on , the observation that E
h
V;

~; ; ;
i
vanishes with  (Part (ii) of Proposition B.2) implies
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that the allocations q;s
 
s;

cannot be too large at histories s; such that the impulse responses
Js
 
s;

are large, except perhaps with small probability.12
12Conversely, if the buyers values are not very persistent, then qualities may not be very distorted after the early
periods of the relationship. In the extreme case, where the buyers values are independently distributed across time,
we have Js
 
s;

= 0 whenever s >  . The optimal allocation then coincides with the e¢ cient allocation at every
date after the arrival date  (i.e., q;s
 
s;

= ;s for all s >  and all s; ).
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